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DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAW OF TORTS IN INDIANA
1940-1945
FOWLER V HARPER*
During war, as in peace, the problems of people living
together result in about the usual number of Torts cases
which get into the courts. The Indiana Supreme and Appel-
late Courts, during the past four years, have ground out a
substantial number of such cases. Many of them are un-
important so far as the growth of the law is concerned. Most
of the grade crossing, auto collision, pedestrian-auto acci-
dents fall into the usual patterns. In many instances, the
appellate court is merely called upon to review the record to
determine whether there were facts sufficient to support
the jury's findings, no new or troublesome questions of law
being involved. No two cases, of course, are exactly alike.
And yet one sometimes wonders how cases involving per
fectly understood and accepted principlei of law get into the
appellate courts at all.
On the other hand, the Indiana Courts, have decided a
number of important cases during the period in question.
In some instances the rule of law was laid down for the first
time m the State. The following pages discuss only cases
which made new law. applied old principles to somewhat
different situations or involved important problems of legal
analysis or policy.
Problems Under the Indiana Automobile Guest Statute
The question of what constitutes "wanton" and "willful"
misconduct under the Indiana Automobile Guest statute, has
received several clarifying decisions during the past few
years. A mere failure to exercise ordinary care, of course,
is not enough to subject the driver of the automobile to
liability to his gratuitous guest. The difference is one of
kind. An inadvertent driver is not a wanton or reckless
difference in degree is so great that it is treated as one of
kind. An inadvertent driver is not a wanton or reckless
driver. Wantonness can never be predicated on absentmind-
edness, preoccupation, or a failure to utilize one's senses or
* Professor of Law, Indiana Umversity.
1. Burns' 1940 Replacement §11-265.
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faculties in such a way as to appreciate the physical sur-
roundings which constitute the danger. To constitute "wan-
tonness," there must be an awareness of the situation and
a deliberate decision to encounter the risk, a very consider-
able risk, it may be added. It is a case of very bad judgment
rather than a failure to advert to the facts of the situation.
"To constitute 'wanton or willful misconduct' it must ap-
pear that the driver of an automobile is conscious of his con-
duct, and with an appreciation of existing conditions knows
that his conduct, if persisted in, will probably result in injury -
to his guest; and yet with the reckless indifference to con-
sequence, he consciously or intentionally persists in such
conduct."'2
There are here, of course, several variables, such as
"probably" result in injury. To what degree of probability?
Propositions are always more or less probable. No rule of
thumb can be given. The answer requires judgment, a judg-
ment on the facts of the particular case, as guided by general
experience. The judgment will ordinarily be that of the
jury, under proper instructions from the court and subject
to the usual control of the judge. In other words, if the
jury's judgment on the issue of "how probable" the injury
must be to constitute "wantonness" is not, in the judge's
view, an unreasonable one, it will stand.
Another troublesome question under the Guest statute
is what constitutes a "guest" within the terms of the act.
What is the distinction between a "guest"' and a "passenger?"
The statute employs the words "without payment for trans-
portation." This is the basis for the distinction. "The word
'guest,'" says the Supreme Court in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Stitzle,3 "has more of social than business significance. The
words 'without payment for such transportation' imply some
valuable consideration for the ride. The presence of the person
injured must have directly compensated the own or operator
in a substantial and material way. If the trip is primarily
social, incidental benefits, though monetary do not exclude
the guest relationship. If the trip is primarily for business
purposes and the one to be charged receives substantial bene-
fit, though not payment in a strict sense, the guest relation-
2. Lee Bros. v. Jones, 114 Ind. App. 688, 699, 50 N.E. (2d) 286 (1944).
See also Bedwell v. DeDolt, 221 Ind. 600, 50 N. E. (2d) 875 (1943).
3. 220 Ind. 180, 41 N. E. (2d) 133 (1942).
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ship does not exist. Expectation of a material gain rather
than social compensation must have motivated the owner or
operator in inviting or permitting the other person to ride."
Although here, too, there are a number of normative
words which require the exercise of judgment in their ap-
plication to specific facts, the standard is reasonably clear
and affords a guide to the solution of particular cases. The
standard is not dissimilar to that employed to distinguish a
"licensee" on the premises of another from an "invitee" or
"business guest." This distinction is necessary to determine
the respective duties owed by the possessor of land toward
persons coming on to his premises with respect to the con-
dition of artificial structures on the land. A licensee is one
on another's land solely for his own benefit whereas the
business guest or invitee is present for a purpose in which
the possessor has a business interest. The mutuality of busi-
ness interest distinguishes the "invitee" from the "licensee."
The social guest is a mere licensee.
In the Stitzle case, the Court would not hold as a matter
of law that the injured person was a guest of the owner of
the car where it appeared that she was an interior decorator,
riding with the owner to Chicago to assist the latter in the
selection of furniture and, through her professional and busi-
ness knowledge and acquaintance, gain access to wholesale
markets. The interior decorator was an employee of a de-
partment store through whom the defendant expected to buy
the furniture and pay regular retail prices. The Court thought
there might be sufficient "business interest" present to take
the decorator out of the "guest" class. In Lee Bros. v. Jones,4
the Appellate Court held that ,as a matter of law, a person
who habitually rode to and from work with the defendant,
a close friend, was a "guest" notwithstanding the fact that
the former paid for the gasoline from time to time, as a
friendly gesture, although he had not paid for the gasoline
on the trip in which he was injured2
In Fuller v. Thrun6 the interesting question was present-
ed whether a child of six could be a "guest" within the mean-
ing of the statute. The child's parents had left her in the
4. 114 Ind. App. 688, 50 N. E. (2d) 286 (1943)
5. See also on sharing expenses, Albert McGann Securities Co., v.
Coen, 114 Ind. App. 60, 48 N. E. (2d) 1000 (1943).
6. 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N. E. (2d) 670 (1941).
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defendant's custody, with instructions to put her to bed at
7:30. Instead, the defendant took her for a ride in his auto-
mobile. The Court held that a "guest" was one who had
accepted an invitation to ride and that a child below seven
years of age could not "accept" such an invitation because
mentally incapable. The child, the Court held, was in the
defendant's custody and while riding with the defendant
was entitled to the exercise by the latter of reasonable care
to avoid injury.
In Long v. Archer7 the Supreme Court held that, al-
though described in the complaint as a "passenger," a plain-
tiff, riding in her employer's automobile within the scope
of her employment, was not- a "guest." The relationship was
one which carried with it the duty on the part of the driver
to exercise reasonable care for her safety.
In two interesting cases, the Supreme Court dealth with
still another difficult question under the Guest statute. What
are the rights of the parties when, as a result of collision
between two automobiles caused by the "willful and wanton"
driving of one and the negligent driver of the other, the
guest of the willful driver and the negligent driver are both
injured? One aspect of the problem was dealt with by the
Supreme Court in Kizer v. Hazelett,8 the other aspect in
Hoesel v. Cain; Kahler v. Cain. 9
In the Kizer case the plaintiff guest brought her action
against the driver of the car in which she was riding (her
son), charging "willful and wanton" driving and the driver
of the other car, alleging negligence. The defendants moved
for seperate trials which were denied. Plaintiff obtained a
judgment against both defendants. The Supreme Court re-
versed for error in refusng the separate trials, reasoning as
follows: "If we should be required to hold in a particular case
that the driver of a car in which a guest was riding was
guilty or willful or wanton misconduct so as to establish a
liability to a guest who was injured in a collesion occasioned
by such misconduct, it is hard to see why the driver of the
other car would be barred by his negligence from recovery
against the host driver so guilty of willful and wanton mis-
conduct. When questions such as these are presented for
7. 221 Ind. 186, 46 N. E. (2d) 818 (1942).
8. 221 Ind. 575, 49 N. E. (2d) 543 (1943).
9. 222 Ind. 330, 53 N. E. (2d) 769 (1943).
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the consideration of the jury in one trial in one pagaraph
of complaint, it seems to us that the opportunity for confu-
sion is so great that as a preventative there well may be a
separation of the issues and separate trials." It is undoubt-
edly correct that contributory negligence is not a defense in
an action against a willful, wanton or reckless defendant.10
It is to be observed that there is no apparent way, under
Indiana practice, that the negligent defendant could sue the
reckless driver in the same action in which they are defend-
ants. It is to be further observed that, if such were pro-
cedurally possible, there are strong reasons for permitting
it in order to avoid inconsistent findings by separate juries.
If would obviously be an unsatisfactory state of affairs were
the guest to recover against the host driver in one case
whereas the negligent driver, in a subsequent case lost be-
cause his jury found the host driver not guilty of willful
misconduct. Theoretically, of course, both injuried parties
should have recovered or neither should have prevailed.
In Hoesel v. Cain and Kahler v. Cain, as in the Kizer
case, plaintiff sued the drivers of both cars and obtained
judgment against both. No motion for separate trials was
made although both defendants took separate appeals which
were consolidated. The second driver contended that the
allegation that the host driver was guilty of willfulness is
conclusive as a matter of law that the negligence of the sec-
ond driver could not have been the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. The question had been discussed but left
open, in the Kizer case. Reasoning largely on the analogy of
the liability of two negligent drivers whose acts concur to
cause injury, the Court rejected the contention, holding that
"the two different kinds of torts, one more culpable than
the other, could concur to cause an 'indivisible injury.' "
Although the contributory negligence of a guest in an
automobile will not bar a recovery against a willful and wan-
ton host, the contributory wantonness of the guest will pre-
vent recovery." This is in accord with sound principles' 2
although it appears to be the first decision on the point in
Indiana.
10. See Restatement of Torts, § 842; Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442(1880), Harper on Torts, § 150, § 151 and cases cited.
11. Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. (2d) 836 (1942).
12. Restatement of Torts, § 482 (2).
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Duty to Aid Person in Peril
The troublesome problem of duty to aid others, in peril
through their own fault, the fault of a third person or through
accident, was before the Court in Ayres & Co. v. Hicks.13
Plaintiff, a boy of six, visited the store with his mother.
While using the escalator, the lad fell and caught his hands
in the moving parts of the machinery at a place where the
escalator disappeared into the floor. The findings of the
jury exonerated the defendant of negligence in the choice,
construction, maintenance and operation of the escalator.
Having no reason to anticipate such an accident, defendant,
accordingly, was not bound to provide an attendant.
The evidence, however, disclosed that after the plain-
tiff's fingers had been caught in the mechanism, the esclalator
continued to run for seventy steps (of 15 inches) for a period
of from three to five minutes before it was stopped. The
boy's injuries were increased by the continued grinding ef-
fect on his fingers which were not extricated until the esca-
lator was stopped. The Court held that, although defendant
was not liable for plaintiff's original injury, it was under a
duty to use reasonable care to rescue an invitee or business
guest on its premises in peril through use of an instrument
provided by defendant and under its control. Judgment
on a verdict recovered by plaintiff was properly reversed,
however, because of an incorrect instruction that the jury
could consider "all phases" of plaintiff's injuries in assessing
damages. Such an instruction, of course, would enable the
jury to award damages for the initial injury as well as the
aggravation thereof which alone resulted from the defend-
ant's negligence.
I am not my brother's keeper at common law. There
is no general duty to aid others in peril.' 4 There must be
some relationship between the parties sufficient to justify
the imposition of such a duty. It is submitted that the Court's
position in the Hicks case is sound and that the relationship
of invitor-invitee is such as to justify the affirmative duty
to aid the invitee in peril through the use of facilities pro-
vided by the invitor. There probably would be no such duty
13. 220 Ind. 86, 41 N. E. (2d) 356 (1941)
14. See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257, 44 Atl. 809 (1897);
Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid Others, 56 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 217(1908); Restatement of Torts, §314.
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to aid an invitee in danger from some source other than the
condition of the premises or the facilities thereon, as, for
example, where the invitee is injured by the accidental dis-
charge of a gun which he is carrying. [An exception to
this rule is the case of injury to an invitee by another invitee
which the invitor could prevent by the exercise of reasonable
efforts to control the second invitee's conduct 5 Similarly
there probably would be no duty to aid one not a bona fide
invitee (e.g., a shoplifter) who is in peril even by use of
defendant's facilities properly and carefully operated. The
combination of the two factors, however, would appear to
establish a relationship between the parties which carries
with it the duty to rescue, according to well-established prin-
ciples of the common law.
Proximate Cause
In recent years, the Indiana Courts have stressed the
"substantial factor" test as throwing light on the problem
of proximate cause. This, together with the test of "fore-
seeability," constitutes the current rubric. Whether "the
defendant's act is a substantial factor in producing the in-
jury of the plaintiff and whether such injury was reason-
ably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's misconduct"' 6
is the favorite test of proximate or legal cause. "Substantial"
presumably means much the same thing as "material," also
an approved word in Indiana. It apparently has a double
significance: 1. that the defendant's negligence contributed
-n fact to the injury, that is, was at least an important actual
cause, and 2. that there was no unforeseeable intervening
force which makes the defendant's negligence unsubstantial
or relatively unimportant. If the defendant's negligence
is a "substantial factor" in this sense, it is immaterial that
the extent of the injury or the manner of its occurrence is
wholly unforeseeableY.1
As pointed out in several recent cases, 8 the "exact na-
15. See Restatement of Torts, § 318; Harper and Kime, Duty to
Control Conduct of Third Persons, 43 Yale L. J. 886; 9 Ind.
L. J. 498 (1934); and see Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Dawson,
31 Ind. App. 605, 68 N. E. 909 (1903)
16. Swanson v. Slagel, 212 Ind. 394, 8 N. E. (2d) 993 (1937).
17. Restatement of Torts, § 435, quoted with approval in Tabor v.
Continental Baking Co., 110 Ind. App. 633, 644, 38 N. E. (2d)
257 (1941)
18. e. g., Daugherty v. Hunt, 110 Ind. 264, 272, 38 N. E. (2d) 250(1941).
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ture of the injury" need not be foreseeable. It is enough
that the general class of injury was one that could have been
anticipated. Actually, this is the criterion for determining
negligence rather than proximate cause; a confusion between
the risk which constitutes negligence, if it is unreasonable,
and the way or manner or sequence of events through which
the risk materializes into injury. The Indiana courts, it may
be said, are by no means the only one guilty of this confusion.
The tendency to discuss the negligence problem in terms
of proximate causation is further illustrated in Riesbeck
Drug Co. v. Wray.' 9 In this case plaintiff's decedent had
committed suicide by drinking a bottle of carbolic acid which,
at his instruction, the decedent's son, a lad of eight, had
bought at defendant's drug store. The Court held that the
defendant's negligence in selling the poison to the boy was
not the proximate cause of the decedent's death because, al-
though it was alleged he was of unsound mind, there was
no evidence that he did not realize the physical effects of
his acts. This technique works out very well in the principal
case. It is a sound and established rule that an intentional
suicide breaks the causal relation between the death so caused
and the original negligence and the Court cited ample au-
thority to support it.
But what if the decedent had been in a delirium and
had not realized what he was doing? By the reasoning in-
volved in the case, defendant would have been liable although
it is highly dubious that it should have been so held. The
case is different from those in which the rule originated.
Those cases were ones in which the defendant, by its neg-
ligence, had caused injury to the plaintiff which in turn
resulted in unsound mind. In the present case, the defend-
ant's conduct had nothing whatever to do with the decedent's
mental condition. It is submitted that the real problem here
is one of negligence which, when properly determined, leaves
no question of causation. Was the defendant, in selling
poison to the child negligent to any person other than the
child? Perhaps. Such conduct might constitute negligence to-
ward the child's playmates who knew no more of its harmful
qualities than did the boy who bought it. But is the act of
selling to the child negligence toward the child's father?
19. 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N. E. (2d) 776 (1942).
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Does it expose him to an unreasonable risk of injury. It is
obvious that it did not, unless the defendant knew or should
have known that the father was in such a mental condition
that he might use it for self destruction. The test of fore-
seeability goes to the nature, extent and character of the
risk and is thus primarily one of the essential criteria for
determining negligence.
In relation to proximate cause, the test of foreseeability
is primarily helpful in determining the legal effect of inter-
vening forces. Two recent Appellate Court cases are typical.
In Indiana Service Corporation- the plaintiff was hurt when
defendant's electric light pole fell on him. The pole was old
and rotten. But it had fallen because a motorist had run
into and broke another pole, in good condition, which was
connected by wires to the defective pole. The act of the
motorist was an independent force the intervention of which
was not reasonably foreseeable. In Shubert v. Thompson2l
a child had died of burns received from a fire started by
other children who carried burning embers from an old cross-
tie which had been set on fire by the defendant's track crew
who negligently left the crosstie afire. Here again, the harm-
ful intervention of the children was not foreseeable. Thus,
the railroad's negligence was not the proximate cause of the
decedent's death.
A third Appellate Court case is illustrative of an inter-
vening force which was foresee able and which, therefore,
did not break the chain of causation between the defend-
ant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.22 Workmen em-
ployed by a railroad company had started a fire to clear up
its right-of-way which was a short distance from the high-
way. Unable to see because of huge clouds of smoke, a
motorist drove into the plaintiff's automobile from the rear.
The motorist's acts, whether negligent or not, did not con-
stitute a superceding cause. The risk of such a collision
was the very hazard that made the defendant's conduct neg-
ligent. Being thus foreseeable, the motorist's act of run-
ning into plaintiff's car did not break the causal relation be-
tween the defendant's negligence and the damage.
Careful analysis of the proper use and function of the
20. 109 Ind. App. 204, 34 N. E. (2d) 776 (1942).
21. 109 Ind. App. 34, 32 N. E. (2d) 120 (1941).
22. Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 109 Ind. App. 693, 34 N. E. (2d) 943 (1941).
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factor of "foreseeability" would avoid much confusion in
negligence cases.
Contributing Negligence and Proximate Cause
In Cousins v. Glassburn23 the Supreme Court had before
it the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff in
an action for injury sustained in an automobile accident.
The trial court had instructed the jury that if the plaintiff's
violation of the speed limit "materially" contributed to the
injury the verdict should be for the defendant. The plaintiff
appealed, contending that the instruction was erroneous be-
cause the court had failed to use the word "proximate" in
defining contributory negligence. It was held there was no
error. "The failure to use the word 'proximate' in defining
contributory negligence," said the Court, "does not constitute
error if other words are used which exclude the idea of a
remote, indirect or insignificant causal connection between
the negligence and the accident. '24 This appears to be com-
pletely sound. Entirely too much emphasis is placed in
many cases on the exact rubric used by the trial judge in his
instructions. It is doubtful whether the word "proximate"
conveys any more definite or precise idea to the jury than it
does to most judges. It is almost certain that the words "ma-
terially contribute" would be mare intelligible to the average
juror than the words "proximately contribute." Indeed many
legal scholars have advocated abolition of the words "proxi-
mate cause" and the substitution therefor of the word "legal
cause." This would be of no material assistance to the jurors,
however, without some further indication of what constituted
"legal cause." The adverb "materially" is at least more
helpful than the word "proximately."
The Court in the Cousins Case further said that "to
establish the defense of contributory negligence it is not
necessary to show that the plaintiff's negligence was the
sole proximate cause of the injury, but only that it was a
concurring or cooperating proximate cause." This, too, is
a point worth making. One may find numerous instances
in the cases of statements that the basis for the defense of
contributory negligence is that the plaintiff's misconduct
23. 216 Ind. 431, 24 N. E. (2d) 1013 (1939).
24. See Earle v. Porter, 112 Ind. App. 71, 40 N. E. (2d) 381 (1942)
to the same effect.
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and not the defendant's is the proximate cause of the injury.
This, of course, is sheer nonsense. In a genuine case of con-
tributory negligence which bars a recovery, the negligence
of both parties are causes of the injury. The reason the
plaintiff does not recover is not because the defendant's neg-
ligence is not proximately connected with the injury, but
because of reasons of public policy which will not permit one
of two wrong-doers to recover from the other. The prin-
ciple is cognate to the principle of no contribution among
tort feasors. The law will neither permit one of two negli-
gent parties who has been injured to recover from the other,
nor will it pernit one of two negligent parties who has re-
sponded in damages to a third persons to recover a propor-
tionate share from the other negligent party. Courts were
not established to adjust the respective rights and equities
of wrongdoers. Much confusion can be avoided by the dis-
tinction between the policies incorporated in the principle of
contributory negligence and the policy embodied in the prin-
ciple of proximate cause.
Liability of Contractor to Persons on Premises
In Rush v. Hunziker25 the Supreme Court dealt with the
problem of the liability of an independent contractor who
had constructed a temporary railing around the porch of an
in completed clubhouse at a boat club. The plaintiff, a guest
of an officer of the club, was injured when the railing gave
way because of its defective construction. The Court, fol-
lowing several cases in other jurisdictions, held that the con-
tractor owed a duty to use reasonable care in the construction
of the railing to all persons rightfully on the premises with
the consent or at the invitation of the owner or possessor.
The principle has been formulated in the Restatement of
Torts: "one who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a
structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject
to the same liability, and enjoys the same immunity from
liability, as though he were the possessor of the land, for
bodily harm caused to others within and without the land,
while the work is in his charge, by the dangerous character
of the structure or other conditions. 126
This section of the Restatement was quoted and followed




by the Appellate Court in Pentecost Const. Co. v. O'Donnell,27
holding that a subcontractor on a construction job owed the
duty to maintain a steel structure which he was installing
in a reasonably safe condition in favor of the employees of
the general contractor lawfully using the structure.
Imputed Negligence
In Lindley v. Sink,28 an action was brought by the dece-
dent's adrmnistrator for wrongful death. The decedent had
met her death in an automobile collision between the car in
which she was riding, driven by her husband, and the auto-
mobile driven by the defendant. The defendant contended
that it the decedent's husband, who would be a beneficiary
of any verdict recovered for his wife's death, had also been
driving negligently there could be no recovery. In other words,
the case raised the question of the effect of the contributory
negligence of a beneficiary in an action for wrongful death.
A few decisions hold that the contributory negligence of -a
beneficiary bars any recovery for wrongful death even though
there are other beneficiaries who were in no way negligent.
(See cases cited in Opinion.) Other decisions hold that the
recovery is in no way affected by the negligence of the bene-
ficiary because the action for wrongful death is conditioned
upon the ground that it arises only under circumstances
which would have enabled the decedent to maintain an action
had he -survived. Since the negligence of a third person
would not have prevented a recovery by the decedent, it
should not prevent recovery by the estate. The Court held
that recovery was not barred. Because the question was not
before it, the Court did not decide whether the husband's
negligence should have any effect less than barring complete
recovery. This question, however, was answered by the Ap-
pellate Court in 1909 in Cleveland, etc., R. R. Company v.
Bossert 2 in which it was held that where one of several
beneficiaries had negligently contributed to the decedent's
death, the total amount of recovery should be reduced by
the amount of such negligent beneficiary's share. The Re-
statement of Torts has taken the same position. 0
27. 112 Ind. App. 47, 39 N. E. (2d) 812 (1942).
28. 218 Ind. 1, 30 N. E. (2d) 456 (1940).
29. 44 Ind. App. 245, 87 N. E. 158 (1909).
30. See Section 493, Comment a.
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This is a proper rule. The action for wrongul death is a
statutory action unknown to the common law. Its purpose is
to protect the interest of the spouse and next of kin in the
life of the decedent. Its purpose is to compensate the bene-
ficiaries for their loss. It would clearly be inequitable to
impute the negligence of one to other innocent beneficiaries.
At the same time, the negligent beneficiary should not be
permitted to profit by his own wrong. These desirable re-
sults are obtained by the rule in the Bossert Case.
In Gagle v. Heath,3 ' the Appellate Court observed the
distinction between a bailee and an agent driver of an auto-
mobile on the question of imputing the driver's negligence to
the owner. Following Lee v. Layton,3 2 the Court held that
the negligence of even a gratuitous bailee is not imputed to
the bailor so as to preclude the latter's recovery for damage
to the automobile from a negligent third person. On the
other hand, of course, if the driver is an agent of the owner
of the automobile, the driver's negligence will be so imputed.
The case follows majority holdings on both points.
A unique question was presented to the Appellate Court
in Jones v. Kasper. - 3 A house guest without authority ap-
propriated the automobile of his host and persuaded two
other house guests to join him in a joy ride. A collision
resulted as a result of the first guest's negligent driving
which caused injuries to the driver of the other car. The
Court held that the driver's negligence might be imputed to
his two companions so as to make them liable to the injured
party, on the theory that they were in joint wrongful pos-
session of the automobile and thus had joint control thereof.
"It is our opinion after full consideration of the law and
facts in this case, that all of the appellants in the case at bar
stood in the same relationship one to the others, as would
joint owners, joint hirers, and joint borrowers who are in
joint possession, and that the jury, without more, was fully
warranted in inferring a joint control from this relationship."
Last Clear Chance
In Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company v. Williams,"4
31. 114 Ind. App. 566, 53 N. E. (2d) 547 (1943).
32. 95 Ind. App. 663, 167 N.E. 540 (1933).
33. 109 Ind. App. 465, 33 N. E. (2d) 816 (1941).
34. 114 Ind. App. 160, 51 N. E. (2d) 384 (1943).
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the Appellate Court dealt with one of the difficult problems
arising under the doctrine of Last Clear Chance in a re-
markably clear and discriminating manner. The appellee had
recovered judgment for personal injuries received when his
automobile was struck by appellant's locomotive at an inter-
section of the railroad track and road. Appellee relied upon
the doctrine of Last Clear Chance to overcome the effect of
the contributory negligence with which he was charged by
appellant. The facts disclosed that the driver, the appellee,
could have seen the train for a distance of one hundred and
forty-five or one hundred and fifty feet before reaching the
crossing. He was driving at a speed which would have en-
abled him to stop within a few feet. The evidence indicated
further that the head brakeman observed the approaching
automobile when it was some distance from the track. There
was nothing in appellee's conduct to indicate that he did
not observe what any reasonably prudent driver would see,
namely, the approach of the train. The brakeman took no
measures to cause the train to slacken speed or to warn the
approaching motorist by whistle or otherwise. The Court
held that under these circumstances the Last Clear Chance
doctrine was inapplicable and reversed the judgment for ap-
pellee.
In Indiana, the Last Clear Chance doctrine applies only
when the negligent plaintiff is actually discovered by the
defendant. Moreover, it is necessary that the defendant dis-
cover the plaintiff's peril. The peril may be either of two
types: first ,the plaintiff may, by his own negligence, have
gotten himself into a situation of danger from which he is
physically helpless to extricate himself, for example, where
he is injured, drunk, or asleep on the track; second, his dan-
ger may consist of his unawareness of his surroundings as,
for example, where an inadvertent or absent-minded driver
approaches the tracks oblivious of an oncoming train. In
the latter case, the real danger consists in the fact that the
plaintiff is not paying attention to his surroundings. If he
were suddenly to become aware of them, he could save him-
self at almost any moment prior to the accident, particularly
if his speed is not great. When a trainman sees a motorist
approaching a level crossing with the train in plain sight, he
may normally assume that the motorist knows what he is
doing and is aware of his physical surroundings. In such a
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case, the motorist is not in danger. It is only when the
trainman realizes or should realize that the motorist is not
paying attention to his surroundings that he has discovered
the danger. Put in the terms employed by the Court in the
instant case, "The liability of the appellant for the appellee's
ensuing injuries hinges upon whether or not an ordinarily
prudent person, under the conditions and circumstances sur-
rounding the appellant's head brakeman at the time and
place, would have realized that the appellee was not going
to yield the right of way over the crossing to appellant's
train, and that such realization would have come to such
person in time to have averted the accident in the exercise
of reasonable care." This case should help to clarify the
Indiana law of Last Clear Chance.
Assumption of Risk
In the Indiana cases, as well as cases in other states,
there is a good bit of confusion between the doctrine of as-
sumed risk and the doctrine of contributory negligence. The
difference is a basic one. In a case of contributory negli-
gence, both the plaintiff and the defendant have been guilty
of negligence which contributed proximately to the plaintiff's
injury. In a case of assumed risk, neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant has been negligent. Of course, in neither case
is there a recovery. Two typical cases decided by the Ap-
pellate Court will make clear the proper application of as-
sumed risk.
In Emhardt v. Perry Stadium 5 the plaintiff was injured
while attending a balgame. A foul ball was knocked into
the open stands where he was sitting. The ball was recov-
ered by another fan who attempted to return it to the playing
field but hit the plaintiff instead. It was held that the risk
of foul balls being knocked into the unprotected stands was
well-known to the public and that the plaintiff, having ex-
posed himself voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
danger, could not recover.
Another recent case involving a typical assumption of
risk is Carmen v. Eli Lily & Company. 6 Here the plaintiff's
decedent died as a result of an anti-rabies vaccine manufac-
tured by the defendant. A printed pamphlet furnished by
35. 113 Ind. App. 197, 46 N. E. (2d) 704 (1942).
36. 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N. E. (2d) 729 (1940).
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the manufacturer had fully informed the deceased as to
the fatal results which occassionally followed its use. With
full knowledge, he submitted to the treatments and thus as-
sumed the risk. The defendant had discharged its legal duty
toward the decedent by the warning.
The reason a plaintiff who has assumed the risk may
not recover is because the defendant has violated no duty
toward him and is, therefore, not negligent. When a man
voluntarily enters into a relation with another with full
knowledge of the hazards involved, he is not entitled to ex-
pect the other to protect him against such hazards. The
doctrine originated as an incident to the relation of master
and servant. The servant assumed the known risks inherent
in the job he undertook. The master owed no duty to pro-
tect him against such risks. This was the typical common
law principle. It required legislation to change the rules
with respect to assumed risk in connection with the master-
servant relation. The same principle, however, is applicable
to all voluntary relations, contractual and otherwise.
Statutory Duties
The Supreme Court in the case of Heiny, Admx. v. Penn.
R. R. Co., 37 construed the statute which requires the driver of
a vehicle loaded with explosives or highly inflammable ma-
terials to stop the vehicle and "ascertain definitely that no
train, car or engine is approaching."38 In an action by dece-
dent's administrator, the defendant pleaded contributory neg-
ligence, arguing in substance that had the plaintiff complied
with the statute the accident could not have happened. The
trial judge concurred in this argument and directed a verdict
against the plaintiff. The theory appears to have been that
of res ,psa loquitor. The Supreme Court took the defend-
ant's view, declining to interpret the statute in a way that
would make the operator of such a vehicle practically an
insurer of his own safety. The Court declined "to ascribe
to the General Assembly an intent to establish a different
standard of conduct for determining contributory negligence
than that which obtains when the question of negligence is
in issue." "It is to be remembered", continued the Court,
"that we are not here dealing with a statute that undertakes
37. 221 Ind. 367, 47 N. E. (2d) 145 (1942).
38. Burns' 1933, § 14-557.
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to create a new right of action or to take away one that
previously existed. This is basically a common law action
and the legal duty resting on the decedent is for the deter-
mination of the court. We hold therefore that the decedent's
conduct, like that of the appellee's, is to be measured by
the standard of ordinary care. It will not be presumed that
the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence merely
because there was a collision between his truck and the
locomotive."
The opinion in the Heiny case was filed March 19.,, 1943.
Ten days later the Court held that "the obvious purpose of
the statute is to prevent collisions between trains and ve-
hicles transporting dangerous material." The violation of a
statutory duty the purpose of which is to avoid a particular
and specific risk constitutes negligence per se,39 except per-
haps, in that type of situation where the statutory rule has
no intrinsic merit with respect to safety but operates only
as a convention. The law of the road is a good example of
the exception. The rule which requires vehicles to drive
on the right hand side of the road is no more calculated to
avoid accidents than, as in England, a rule which requires
vehicles to drive on the left. A violation therefore of such
a rule may under certain circumstances not constitute neg-
ligence.4° Indeed a driver may be negligent by not viol-
lating the rule where the exigencies of the occasion obviously
require it. The statute in question is not such a rule. It
is more than a convention. It is patently calculated to avoid
the risk of collisions in situations where, by reason of the
contents of the vehicle, a collision would be unusually dan-
gerous. It is difficult, therefore, to accept the Court's reason
in the Heiny case that the conduct of the driver of a truck
loaded with expjosives is to be judged by the common law
standard of care. Notwithstanding this, the result of the
decision would appear to be sound. It is submitted that this
result may be reached by an interpretation of the act which
requires only that the driver stop and reasonably satisfy him-
self that it is safe to proceed. The word "ascertain definitely"
should not be given a strict and literal interpretation. To
"ascertain definitely" may well mean merely to make sure
in ones own mind that no train is coming. Such an interpre-
39. See Restatement of Torts, § 286.
40. Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N. Y. 124, 19 N. E. (2d) 987 (1939).
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tation would probably achieve the legislative intention and
would not require the driver to cross the track at his peril.
In Remington v Hesler,41 plaintiff sustained damage
to her person and her automobile when she drove into an
unguarded hole in the street. Defendant defended on the
ground of contributory negligence since plaintiff ran into
the hole while crossing to the left hand side of the street
to park, thus violating the statutory law of the road.4 2 The
Court declined to hold plaintiff guilty of contributory negli-
gence per se. The Court reasoned that the statute "was
designed to protect travelers in other vehicles and was not
designed to protect municipalities". This argument is slightly
garbled. The real reason for the decision is that the statute
was not designed to protect persons from defects in the
streets, hence plaintiff was not failing to take proper pre-
cautions to protect herself from such risks by violating the
statute. The result was right for the wrong reason.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res Ipsa Loquitur was invoked by the plaintiff to sup-
port her claim for damages in Phillips v Klepfer.43 The
plaintiff had been a patron at the Indiana State Fair where
she tripped on some wood which had been nailed to the flat
surface of a runway of an amusement device called a "Cater-
pillar". The contention was denied. The Court pointed out
the difference between this case and one where a person is
injured while riding, as a result of an accident caused by
the vehicle's defective equipment or operation. When a
person is riding on a railroad train and a wreck occurs, he,
of course, has no way of proving either how the accident
happened or who was responsible for it. The instrumentality
is under the exclusive control of the railroad and only the
railroad and its servants have the knowledge or the means of
knowledge to explain the accident. It is in such cases only
that the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is applied to require
the defendant to show that the accident happened without
any negligence on the part of himself or his employee's. Such
obviously was not the situation in this case. Moreover, Res
Ipsa is applicable only in situations where injuries do not
41. 111 Ind. App. 404, 41 N. E. (2d) 657 (1941).
42. § 47-2123, Burns' 1940 Replacement.
43. 217 Ind. 237, 27 N. E. (2d) 340 (1940).
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ordinarily occur unless somebody has been negligent. It is
for this reason that, although the doctrine has been applied
for many years to railroads, it has not yet been applied against
commercial aviation companies. The operation of railroads
has been so perfected that it is a rare accident indeed that
is not explained by the oversight or negligence of some em-
ployee. On the other hand, for obvious reasons, many air-
plane accidents are never explained and it would be a violent
assumption that all or nearly all of them are the result of
negligently defective equipment or operation.
In Coca Cola Bot. Wks. v. Williams,44 the Appellate Court
held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to foreign
substances of a deleterious nature found in a bottle of Coca
Cola. This rule is defensible since the defendant, if anybody,
can explain how such substances got into the bottle and the
situation is one which ordinarily occurs only when someone
connected with the bottling process has been negligent.
Invitee or Licensee
In Kirklin v. Everman,45 the plaintiff entered the plant
of a water works corporation operated by the town of Kirk-
land at the request of the manager to discuss the matter of
plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff was asked by the manager
to go into a pit containing a gasoline engine and to light a
match in order to find a screw driver. The pit was full of
gasoline fumes which immediately exploded causing injury
to the plaintiff. The defendant urged that because the plain-
tiff was looking for employment, he was only a licensee on
the prenses to whom the defendant owed no duty other
than to warn the licensee of concealed danger. The Court
ruled otherwise, holding that the plaintiff was on the prem-
ises in the common interest of himself and the Water Works
Company and, as such, entitled to the protection of an "in-
vitee" or what the Restatement of Torts describea as a "busi-
ness guest." The case follows the usual holding in such sit-
uations. It is to be noted that, even had the plaintiff been
regarded as a bare licensee, he probably should have recov-
ered, since he was not only exposed to a danger unknown
to him, although known to the manager of the water works,
but was actually invited to encounter the danger. It seems
44. 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N. E. (2d) 702 (1941).
45. 217 Ind. 683, 29 N. E. (2d) 206 (1940)
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clear that the defendant owed even a licensee the duty of
warning the plaintiff of the existence or probable existence
of gasoline fumes in the pit. Instead of advising the plaintiff
to strike a match, the manager should have warned him of
the danger of such an act.
An invitee or business guest does not lose his status
as such merely because he goes to a part of the premises not
necessary to the transaction of his business. The "invitation"
extends to 'all parts of the premises that may reasonably be
expected to be used in the transaction of the mutual business,
those incidental as well as those necessary." In Silvestro v.
Valz,41 the plaintiff had driven his car to defendant's garage
for repairs. After parking his car, he looked around for a
washroom. In his search, he passed through a door, thinking
it led to another part of the building and, because there was
no light, fell down an unguarded stairway. The Court held
that the jury might reasonably conclude that the plaintiff
was entitled to the status of an invitee at the time of his
injury.
In Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas etc. Co., 47 a boy sought
to recover for injuries sustained while he was climbing on
the superstructure of a bridge by coming in contact with
defendant's uninsulated wires. Defendant sought to show
that plaintiff was a trespasser on the bridge and, therefore,
that it owed him no duty. The Court held that plaintiff's
status on the land was a matter of no concern to the defend-
ant, itself a licensee; that although he might be a trespasser
as against the possessor of the land, he was no trespasser
as to the defendant. The immunity from liability to tres-
passer is a protection to the possessor and no one but such
possessor can claim the benefit of the rule. The holding
follows the leading case on the subject, Dillon v. Twin State
Gas etc. Co.48
Range of Vision Rule-Negligence and Contributory
Negligence
The Supreme Court in Cushman Motor Company v. Mc-
Cabe49 reaffirmed the rule of Opple v. Ray5" that the hard
46. 222 Ind. 163, 51 N. E. (2d) 629 (1943)
47. 109 Ind. App. 681, 34 N. E., (2d) 975 (1941)
48. 85 N. H. 449, 163 Atl. 111 (1932)
49. 219 Ind. 156, 36 N.E. (2d) 769 (1942)
50. 208 Ind. 450, 195 N. E. 81 (1935)
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and fast rule that a motorist must so drive that he can stop
his car within the range of visibility is not the law in Indiana.
Plaintiff's decedent had failed to stop his car when signalled
by a truck driver with a flashlight. The truck had been
parked without lights on the pavement and the plaintiff's
decedent had run into the rear of the truck causing an ac-
cident from which he died. The Court also gave its sanction
to an important distinction between acts which might con-
strue negligence toward a third person and acts which might
construe contributory negligence. "It is true," said the
Court, "that a motorist, seeing a lighted flashlight being
waved on the highway at night would know that someone
was carrying it and would owe the duty to that person to
use due care not to injure him. A violation of that duty
would constitute negligence towards that person so waving
the light, and if injury resulted to him as a result of such
negligence, the motorist would be liable. It does not follow,
however, that while the motorist is violating his duty to use
due care for the safety of such pedestrian, he is also violating
his duty to use due care for his own safety." It is an im-
portant distinction and one that courts sometimes fail to
recognize. Although the same standard of care is, of course,
employed to determine both negligence toward a third per-
son and contributory negligence, the same acts will frequently
constitute negligence toward the third person but not negli-
gence with respect to the actor's safety. The reverse is also
true. The distinction has been noted and approved by the
Restatement of Torts as follows: "Contributory negligence
differs from that of negligence which subjects the actor to
liability for harm done to others in one important particular.
Negligence is conduct which creates an undue risk or harm to
others. Contributory negligence is conduct which involves
an undue risk or harm to the person who sustains it. In the
one case, the reasonable man, whose conduct furnishes the
standard to which all normal adults must conform, is a person
who pays reasonable regards to the safety of others; in the
other, the reasonable man is a reasonably prudent man, who,
as such, pays reasonable regards to his own safety."'"
Duty of Railroad to Children on Premises
Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Jones 52 makes an important
51. Sec. 463, Comment b.
52. 220 Ind. 139, 41 N. E. (2d) 361 (1941)
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contribution to the clarification of the duty of railroads to
children on and about the tracks and yards of the company-
a problem not always handled satisfactorily by the Indiana
cases. Confusion is usually to be found in more or less per-
tinent (and sometimes non-pertinent) discussions-of liability
to trespassers, attractive nuisance, contributory negligence,
last clear chance and proximate cause.
The first problem in such cases is to determine the duty
owed the child. Too often the courts approach this prob-
lem by inquiring whether the child was a trespasser or
whether he was "invited" on to the premises by an "attrac-
tive nuisance." Courts frequently begin with a statement
of the erroneous proposition that the only duty owed a tres-
passer is not to willfully or intentionally injure him. It is
submitted that the principal inquiry should be whether the
presence of children at the place of inquiry was reasonably
to be expected and if so whether, by the defendant's
activities or the condition of the premises and equipment,
the child had been exposed to unreasonable risks. If the
child's presence was probable, for any reason, the railroad
company owes him the duty of reasonable care. This is true
whether a turntable or other device attractive to children
lured hin there or whether, even over the company's pro-
tests, youngsters persisted in trespassing at the place of
injury. The important and vital question is, was the child's
presence there reasonably to be foreseen. The duty of due
care, so far as the company's operations are concerned, is
owed even to adults under these circumstances. 53 There is
a duty to keep a reasonable lookout to discover habitual tres-
passers at a particular place. The duty is extended, in the
case of children, to the condition of the premises and facil-
ities, where they are of such a nature as to create unreason-
able dangers to children of immature judgment.54
The Court, in the Jones case, cut through most of the
tangle and correctly analyzed this problen, holding that "the
probable presence of children upon property where a dan-
gerous activity is being carried on, imposes a duty of ordinary
care upon the owner of such property to anticipate their
53. See Harper on Torts, § 91 and cases cited. Restatement of Torts,§ 334.
54. Indeed, under some circumstances, this duty is also owed to tres-
passing adults. See Restatement of Torts, § 335.
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presence by keeping a look-out for them."' 5 5 The Court went
farther, applying the same principle to the condition of the
premises. "And if the probable presence of the children
raises a duty to them of ordinary care," it continued, "this
may be violated before the children arrive upon the premises,
by leaving things undone which ought to have been done in
anticipation of their coming." This clear analysis and forth-
right holding should eliminate much confusion which has
heretofore existed in the Indiana law dealing with injuries
to children on railroad properties.
Fraud
In Automobile Underwriters, Inc., v. Rich, 56 plaintiff
filed an action for damages alleged to have been sustained
by reason of the fraud of defendant's agent in inducing her
to execute a release and covenant not to sue. Plaintiff had
been injured in an automobile accident. Defendant's agent
was alleged to have procured the release by telling her: one,
that he was a lawyer and knew her rights; two, that she
didn't need a lawyer; three, that she could not hope to re-
cover more than a hundred and fifty dollars; four, that if
she didn't accept that amount she wouldn't get anything;
five, that her injuries were only temporary and that she
could go to work within a few days; six, that a jury of
farmers in the county would give her nothing; and seven,
that even if she did recover, her lawyers would take all the
money.
The evidence disclosed, with respect to the fifth state-
ment, that the agent had talked with plaintiff's physician
and that he had indicated that plaintiff's injuries were only
temporary. The Court held that the other statements were
matters of opinion only and that there was no evidence that
they were not honestly expressed.
A statement of opinion may be the basis for recovery
in deceit. Fraud there must be, but the statement of opinion
that the speaker does not actually hold constitutes fraud.
A fraudulent statement of opinion by an adverse party, with
no special knowledge, dealing at arms length is not action-
able. In a competitive society people must stand on their
own judgments and opinions. But there are exceptions.
The "special knowledge" exception 57 might be applicable in
55. Quoted by the Court from a note in 14 Ind. L. J. 376.
56. 222 Ind. 384, 53 N. E. (2d) 775 (1943)
57. See Picard v. McCormick, 11 Mich. 68 (1862); Andrews v. Jack-
son, 168 Mass. 266, 47 N. E. 412, 37 A. L. R. 402 (1897); Manley
v. Felty, 146 Ind. 194, 45 N. E. 74 (1896)
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the instant case. The defendant's agent was an expert;
plaintiff was presumably untutored in legal affairs and from
the exaggerated character of some of the alleged statements,
the inference might reasonably be made that the agent did
not hold the opinions stated. It is arguable, therefore, whe-
ther the Court should have taken the position that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff had failed to make out a case
of actionable fraud.
In McClellan v. Tobin,"8 a party to a real estate trans-
fer failed to obtain recovery for false and fradulent state-
ments made to her when she testified that she had not be-
lieved the statements because she knew they were not true.
The case raises the question of the state of mind required
to support a recovery for fradulent misrepresentation. The
law requires that he rely upon the statements. Indeed, it
requires that he rely upon their truth. In Hagee v. Gross-
man, 19 it was held that the plaintiff could not recover for
fradulent misrepresentation in connection with the purchase
of a quantity of flour when it appeared that the plaintiff
had himself inspected the flour to determin its quality. The
jury found that the defendant had relied upon his own tests
and not the defendant's misrepresentation. It should be noted
that the mere fact that the defendant used some of the flour
for test purposes is indicative that he did not believe the
defendant's statement about the flour. A curious problem
is raised where a party makes his own examination of
property in connection with a proposed purchase and there-
by discovers the falsity of the defendant's statement, but at
considerable expense to himself in making the discovery.
It was held in Enfield v. Colburn 0 that the expense of ex-
posing the falsity of the misrepresentations could not be
recovered because the plaintiff had not relied upon their
truth. Actually, he might be said to have acted in reliance
upon their falsity. In any event, he did not believe them to
be true otherwise he would not have investigated. "It is
the damages which result from acting upon false represen-
tations, as if they were true, and not the expense of de-
tecting their falsity which a plaintiff is entitled to recover.61
58. 219 Ind. 563, 39 N. E. (2d) 772 (1941)
59. 31 Ind. 223 (1869).
60. 63 N. H. 218 (1884)
61. Enfield v. Colburn, Supra.
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Interference with Contract Relations
The famous case of Lumley v. Guy 2 established the
principle, as a part of the common law, that the intentional
intreference by a third person, without justification, where-
by one of the parties to a contract is induced to break it,
constitutes a tort. In Wade v. Culp,18 the plaintiff had
entered into a contract with an inventor, whereby the latter
was to invent and develop an electric steak broiler, the
plaintiff to furnish the shop, tools and finances; and, on
the satisfactory development of the same, the plaintiff was
to arrange for the manufacture and distribution of the broil-
er. After the broiler had been developed, the inventor en-
tered into a contract with the defendant company whereby
it was to produce and market the broiler. Defendant was
held liable for the actual out-of-pocket losses sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the breach of contract by the
inventor. No force, threats or fraud of any kind was em-
ployed by the defendant company in inducing the breach.
Indeed, it appears that the inventor first approached the
defendant company and offered to enter into such an ar-
rangement. The defendant company, however, acted with
full knowledge of the outstanding contract between the in-
ventor and the plaintiff. It was only in this sense that the
defendant company "induced" the breach. The case, there-
fore, comes to this: it is a tort to enter into a contract with
a person known to be under an inconsistent contract with
a third person, if, as a result thereof, loss is caused to the
third party by a breach of the contract with him.
62. 2 E. & B. 216 (1853)
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